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The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act: A 
Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral 
Problem 
Anthony D. Todero* 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 2009, Senator Levin introduced the Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act (the “Act”) in the Senate.1  Like its name 
implies, the goal of the Act is “[t]o restrict the use of offshore tax 
havens and abusive tax shelters . . . .”2  The Obama 
Administration fully supports the Act.3  Although the bill is 
currently in committee (as of Nov. 1, 2009),4 many speculate 
 
* Anthony D. Todero, M.A., Communication Studies, University of Minnesota, J.D. 
Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School.  This Note would not be possible 
without the support of my partner, Leslie, and my parents, Joseph and Catherine.  I 
am grateful for all that they have done for me.  I would also like to thank Micah 
Reyner, Elliot Ginsburg, and the staff of the Minnesota Journal of International Law 
for making this a better Note. 
 1. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP, SENATOR LEVIN AND 
REPRESENTATIVE DOGGETT INTRODUCE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT (2009), 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25385.pdf.  Representative 
Doggett introduced an identical bill (H.R. 1265) in the House of Representatives on 
March 3, 2009.  Id. 
 2. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 3. Kevin Drawbaugh & Corbett Daly, Obama Administration Backs Congress 
Tax Haven Crackdown, REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
politicsNews/idUSTRE52271L20090303 (“We fully support the legislation . . . on 
offshore tax centers . . . .”); see also Press Release, Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary, U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Written Testimony House Ways 
and Means Committee Hearing—As Prepared for Delivery (Mar. 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg47.htm (stating that the Obama 
Administration “will propose rules to both reform U.S. corporations’ ability to defer 
foreign earnings and deter high income individuals and corporations from using tax 
havens to avoid taxation.”). 
 4. See Govtrack.us: A Civic Project to Track Congress, S.506: Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-506 (last visited Nov. 
2, 2009) (describing the legislative history of the bill).  Bills introduced in Congress 
first go to committees where Senators and Representatives deliberate, investigate, 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  9:37 AM 
242 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
that the legislation will pass in the current session.5  In the 
event of its passage, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act will fail to 
eliminate tax havens and foreign tax evasion.6  The Act is not 
geared toward international cooperation.  Instead, it uses a 
“name and shame” strategy, which other countries have an 
incentive to oppose.7 
Fortunately, alternative mechanisms for the exchange of 
international tax information exist, such as an international tax 
authority with domestic enforcement powers8 or a market-
oriented solution that would use cash as consideration for tax 
information.9  Both alternatives could improve the exchange of 
tax information necessary to enforce U.S. tax laws.  These 
alternatives take into account the needs of tax haven 
jurisdictions and therefore are more likely to promote 
international cooperation.10  Rather than place the United 
 
and revise the bills.  Then the bills are sent to the floor for general debate.  Most 
bills do not make it out of committee.  Id. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Parts III.B.1–5. 
 7. The Act refers to targeted tax havens as “foreign secrecy jurisdictions.”  See 
S. 506 § 101(b).  For how the Act defines a “foreign secrecy jurisdiction,” see infra 
Part III.B.  Other nations’ politicians and bankers do not like the stigma attendant 
with the label of “foreign secrecy jurisdiction” because it might scare away reputable 
clients.  See States of Guernsey, Chief Minister Welcomes G20 Summit Outcome, 
http://www.gov.gg/ccm/treasury-and-resources/press-releases/2009/chief-minister-
welcomes-g20-summit-outcome.en?textonly=yes (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (quoting 
Guernsey Chief Minister Lyndon Trott after the island signed thirteen Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements: “This puts to bed, once and for all, the myth that 
the island of Guernsey is a tax haven . . . . The stigma of tax haven status should be 
gone forever.”); Anthony Faiola & Mary Jordan, Tax-Haven Blacklist Stirs Nations: 
After G-20 Issues Mandate, Many Rush to Get Off Roll, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 
A7 (giving examples of countries, such as Austria and the Philippines, that promised 
to exchange tax information after the G-20 countries unveiled a new “list of shame”).  
Moreover, Swiss banks, for example, face the uneasy choice between violating U.S. 
law or defying Swiss law’s stringent bank secrecy provisions.  See David S. 
Hilzenrath, IRS, Justice Target Undisclosed Assets in Swiss Accounts, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 1, 2008, at D01 (describing the predicament of Swiss bank UBS in trying to 
comply with a U.S. court order that is contrary to Swiss secrecy laws). 
 8. See ZVI DANIEL ALTMAN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER TAX TREATIES 351 
(2005) (explaining that an international mechanism trusted by all treaty partners is 
inherently necessary for coordination, but that enforcement, because of sovereignty, 
necessitates an international tax institution capable of domestic enforcement). 
 9. See generally Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax 
Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 658–61 (2008) (discussing the pros and cons of a 
more complete market for tax shelter information). 
 10. See United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis 
and its Impact on Development, New York, June 1–3, 2009, Outcome of United 
Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on 
Development, ¶ 35, available at http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/ 
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States in the unenviable position of global tax enforcer, an 
international tax authority or a more complete market for tax 
information would better facilitate the exchange of 
extraterritorial tax information and promote U.S. tax 
enforcement. 
This Note does not consider the entirety of the Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act.  Instead, the brunt of the criticism is levied at 
the Act’s list of tax havens.11  The Act identifies specific 
jurisdictions as tax havens;12 mandates heightened scrutiny of 
financial transactions conducted in those jurisdictions;13 
imposes relaxed evidentiary burdens on prosecutors, in the form 
of rebuttable presumptions,14 to make enforcement of tax laws 
 
financialcrisis/outcomedoc.pdf (highlighting the need for inclusive policies that will 
allow developing countries to benefit from international tax cooperation); see also 
Steven A. Dean, End the Barter System, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.brooklaw.edu/news/homepage_news/dean_tax_article.pdf (advocating 
compensating cooperative countries with cash rather than bartering for the 
exchange of extraterritorial tax information). 
 11. See generally Brigitte Unger & Joras Ferwerda, Regulating Money 
Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role of Blacklisting (Tjalling C. Koopmans 
Research Inst. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 08-12, May 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/08-12.pdf, for more about the strategy of 
“naming and shaming” tax havens. 
 12. See S. 506 § 101(b).  According to the initial list in the Act, each of the 
following jurisdictions is an offshore secrecy jurisdiction: Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Samoa, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and 
Caicos, and Vanuatu.  Id. § 101(b). 
 13. For example, the Act allows more time for investigating transactions 
conducted within one of the identified jurisdictions.  In the instance of a tax return 
for a year in which the taxpayer received money from a financial account located in 
an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, “the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court 
for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 
years after the return was filed.”  See id. § 104(a).  The current statute of limitations 
on international tax enforcement is three years.  I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006); see also 
Press Release, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing 
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas 
(May 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/leveling-the-playing-
field-curbing-tax-havens-and-removing-tax-incentives-for-shifting-jobs-overseas/ 
(proposing to increase the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement to 
six years). 
 14. See S. 506 § 101.  The law would amend the Internal Revenue Code by 
establishing a rebuttable presumption relating to control (§ 7492(a)) and transfers of 
income (§ 7492(b)) against persons who participated in transactions involving 
offshore secrecy jurisdictions.  For example, the law provides that a U.S. person 
exercises control over an entity domiciled in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction if she 
has transferred any assets to the entity.  The law also would amend 31 U.S.C. § 
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easier in those jurisdictions; and enacts other provisions all 
geared toward boosting the international enforcement of U.S. 
tax laws.15  Certain sections of the Act are logical amendments 
to the tax code.  For example, the Act extends the statute of 
limitations for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess 
taxes on tax returns requiring offshore examinations from three 
years to six years.16  Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
studies show that offshore examinations take “a median of 500 
more calendar days to develop and examine than other 
examinations” because of technical complexity and the need to 
obtain information from foreign sources.17  The IRS ends some 
offshore examinations prematurely or opts not to conduct them 
at all, even with evidence of noncompliance, because of the 
current three-year statute of limitations.18  It makes sense, 
then, to allow the IRS more time to conduct examinations of 
offshore transactions.  However, the decision to blacklist the 
countries whose cooperation is necessary for the IRS to obtain 
the necessary information to enforce U.S. tax laws demands 
scrutiny and is the focus of this Note. 
In light of the acknowledged caveat in scope, this Note 
proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses the current international 
mechanisms (and their limitations) by which the United States 
attempts to enforce its tax laws abroad.  Part II illuminates the 
impetus behind cracking down on tax havens.  Specifically, two 
recent occurrences—the Liechtenstein and UBS scandals—have 
catapulted tax abuse to the forefront of the collective conscience. 
Part III takes aim at the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.  This 
Note does not take a normative position on the benefits or 
 
5314 (2006) by creating a presumption that any account at a financial institution 
domiciled in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction contains the minimum funds necessary 
to require a report prescribed by tax law.  Id. § 101(d). 
 15. For a summary of the Act’s various provisions, see Cadwalader, 
Wichersham & Taft LLP, Clients & Friends Memo: Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 
506 and H.R. 1265), Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/ 
030609_StopTaxHavenAbuseAct.pdf. 
 16. See supra note 13. 
 17. Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for 
IRS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of 
Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues, Strategic Issues Team, Government 
Accountability Office). 
 18. Id. (“Because of the 3-year statute of limitations on assessments, the 
additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS 
sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not 
to open them at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance.”). 
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drawbacks of tax havens.19  Rather, it assumes that taxation, as 
a mechanism to gather revenues for government programs, is 
necessary.20  A legislative attempt to achieve this goal that will 
fail in practice is worthy of noting.21  Although increasing 
government tax revenue22 is a laudable motivation, the Act does 
not take into account foreign actors’ interests.  As a result, it is 
unlikely to bolster the exchange of tax information, which would 
improve IRS enforcement of U.S. tax laws. 
Part IV concludes this Note by discussing two alternatives 
to the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’s “name and shame” strategy 
of blacklisting tax havens.  A policy of paying cash as 
consideration for tax information would be more successful in 
eliciting the cooperation of foreign actors, but market failures 
and privacy issues are potential concerns.  An international tax 
institution might take a long time to create because existing 
entities, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
 
 19. Although the term “tax haven” is used frequently, “[t]here is no precise 
definition of a tax haven.”  JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 2 (2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
R40623_20090709.pdf.  I do not use the term in any normative sense, but only in a 
descriptive sense to indicate a jurisdiction with few or no taxes, a lack of effective 
information sharing, and a lack of transparency.  See id. (citing ORG. FOR ECON. 
DEV. AND CO-OPERATION, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 
23 (1998)) (describing features of tax havens). 
 20. The normative argument in favor of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act 
assumes that tax havens are “abusive.”  See, e.g., Maria Tihin, Note, The Trouble 
with Tax Havens: The Need for New Legislation in Combating the Use of Offshore 
Trusts in Abusive Tax Shelters, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 419 (2008) 
(focusing on abusive tax shelters and discussing the movement of those shelters to 
offshore jurisdictions). 
 21. The President’s budget request for IRS compliance programs for fiscal year 
2010 includes an increase of “$332.2 million for investments in strong compliance 
programs . . . .”  Fiscal 2010 Appropriations: Financial Services and General 
Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Servs. and General 
Government of the S. Appropriations Comm., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of 
Douglas H. Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).  The Act, therefore, 
does not come without economic costs.  Legislators should hesitate before enacting 
the bill if the likelihood of success is low.  Moreover, less controversial proposals are 
available.  In March 2009, shortly after Senator Levin proposed the Act, Senator 
Baucus proposed a more modest version of the Act that does not contain a blacklist.  
Baucus favors a more targeted approach that would also give the IRS additional 
tools to investigate U.S. tax evaders, but would not condemn all offshore tax havens.  
See Edward Tanenbaum, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act Has Broad Implications, INT’L 
TAX REV., June 2009, available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/includes/ 
magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=720491&ISS=25409&PUBID=35. 
 22.  See Hearing on Fiscal 2010 Appropriations, supra note 21, at 6 (noting that 
new enforcement personnel are expected to generate $2 billion in additional annual 
revenue and an estimated $6 billion in indirect revenue based on the deterrent effect 
of the new enforcement programs by FY 2012). 
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Development (OECD) and the United Nations (U.N.), are not 
compelling status quo auspices for an international tax 
authority.23  Regardless of the potential counterarguments 
against these alternatives, if implemented, both would be more 
successful at facilitating the exchange of extraterritorial tax 
information than the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. 
I.  THE TAX GAP AND CURRENT MECHANISMS OF 
EXCHANGING EXTRATERRITORIAL TAX INFORMATION 
Globalization has collapsed many previously existing legal 
and technological barriers to international capital flows, making 
tax evasion easier and tax administration more difficult.24  The 
Internal Revenue Service’s international enforcement of U.S. 
tax law thus faces daunting challenges.25  The largest obstacle 
in administering U.S. tax law in foreign locales is that much of 
the information needed to enforce these laws is unavailable.26  
The IRS, for example, has difficulty identifying persons outside 
of the United States who are taxable as U.S. residents or 
citizens.27  The IRS does not cross-check passports against filed 
returns to locate those outside the United States who fail to 
file.28  Even if the IRS could identify U.S. residents or citizens in 
 
 23. See Justin Dabner, To Join the International Tax Cartel or Not? How 
Should Asia Respond to the OECD’s Harmful Tax Regimes Project? 11 N.Z. J. TAX’N 
L. & POL’Y 299, 302 (2005) (“The lack of a level playing field has become the major 
issue confronting the OECD.”); Jonathan Gaskin, Note, Policing the Global 
Marketplace: Wielding a Knife in a Gunfight, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 207 
(1999) (noting that the U.N. lacks the authority to implement standards on 
international tax cooperation). 
 24. See Nancy Birdsall, Asymmetric Globalization: Global Markets Require 
Good Global Politics, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 2003, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2003/spring_development_birdsall.aspx (noting 
that unregulated markets make it easier for taxpayers to evade taxes and more 
expensive for countries to enforce their own tax systems). 
 25. See David R. Tillinghast, Issues of International Tax Enforcement, in THE 
CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 38, 39 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) 
(discussing the “prodigious” number of challenges facing the IRS in enforcing U.S. 
tax law in foreign jurisdictions). 
 26. Id.  The IRS has domestic capabilities, e.g., the powers to investigate, 
summons, and sue, to enforce tax laws but lacks similar powers in foreign 
jurisdictions.  Id. 
 27. See generally Hearing on Tax Compliance, supra note 17, at 7–11 
(discussing the difficulty the IRS has in collecting tax information from U.S. persons 
in foreign jurisdictions). 
 28. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39–40 (noting that the IRS has no system 
in place to help administrators perform these cross-checks of passports or green 
cards against filed returns). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  9:37 AM 
2010] THE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT 247 
 
foreign jurisdictions who failed to file their taxes, in many cases 
the IRS has no enforcement mechanism with which to compel 
foreign persons to comply.29  Not surprisingly, few foreign 
withholding agents properly withhold the required taxes from 
their client’s income.30  Moreover, foreign laws, such as bank 
secrecy laws, may limit the disclosure of tax information 
necessary for IRS enforcement.31  Largely due to these 
enforcement difficulties, the United States has a gross tax gap—
“the difference between the aggregate tax liability imposed by 
law for a given tax year and the amount of tax that taxpayers 
pay voluntarily and timely for that year.”32 
In 2005, the IRS estimated that the gross tax gap was 
approximately $345 billion.33  Other countries face similar 
shortfalls in tax revenues.34  A fairness issue arises when some 
 
 29. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that the IRS has “no practical 
way to enforce” U.S. tax obligations against foreign persons).  In the recent 
presidential campaign season, there was a debate about whether or not paying taxes 
is patriotic.  See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., Palin’s Kind of Patriotism, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A31.  If patriotism is not a factor, i.e., if people are foreign to 
the United States, it is logical that foreign persons would ignore U.S. tax laws, 
particularly if the IRS had no means of requiring compliance. 
 30. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that the IRS has had success in 
“inducing foreign financial institutions to ‘volunteer’ to act as withholding agents 
. . . . It has no practical way to enforce this obligation, however, and few foreign 
persons . . . comply.”). 
 31. For example, Switzerland’s bank secrecy is legendary.  Switzerland has a 
“reputation for confidentiality that has helped make a small nation in the Alps a 
magnet for international deposits.”  Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D3.  Generally, 
Swiss law limits a bank’s ability to breach client confidentiality.  More specifically, 
Swiss law affords account holders the chance “to oppose the release of their names 
through a judicial process . . . .”  Id.  See also Prosecutors Focus on Swiss Bank 
Accounts, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.upi.com/ 
Business_News/2008/11/01/Prosecutors-focus-on-Swiss-bank-accounts/UPI-
65601225553320/ (noting that “Swiss banks, by law, cannot disclose account holder 
information . . . .”). 
 32. JAMES M. BICKLEY, TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT (Cong. Research Serv. 
Report No. RL33882, 2007), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/crs/RL33882.pdf 
(citing ALAN PLUMLEY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PRELIMINARY UPDATE OF THE TAX 
YEAR 2001 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX UNDERREPORTING GAP ESTIMATES 15 (2005), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05plumley.pdf). 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP 
AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf; see also David R. Francis, With 
$100 Billion Lost, U.S. Tolerance for Tax Havens Erodes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
June 9, 2008, at 15. 
 34. For example, the United Kingdom’s (UK) public finances are short billions 
of pounds because some of the country’s biggest corporations have complex, opaque, 
albeit legal tax schemes by which they avoid paying taxes to the exchequer.  UK-
based Diageo, which owns Johnnie Walker and Gilbey’s gin, “[d]espite average 
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people pay the taxes required by law and others do not.  
Furthermore, if noncompliance goes unpunished, there is an 
added incentive to those who ordinarily comply to stop paying 
taxes, resulting in “a vicious cycle of increased 
noncompliance.”35 
A.  SOURCES OF THE TAX GAP 
Individual income taxes constitute the majority of the U.S. 
gross tax gap.36  Unreported or underreported income account 
for the bulk of these unpaid taxes.37  Estimates of the annual 
costs of offshore tax abuses are as high as $100 billion per year, 
although accurate estimates of individual tax avoidance38 are 
more difficult than estimates of corporate tax avoidance.39  
Transparency International France estimated that 
approximately $10 trillion U.S. dollars, or over four times the 
amount of France’s gross domestic product, are located in secret 
offshore accounts.40 
 
profits of £2 bn a year . . . paid an average of £43m a year in UK tax – little more 
than 2% of its overall profits.”  Firms’ Secret Tax Avoidance Schemes Cost UK 
billions: Investigation into the Complex and Confidential World of Tax, GUARDIAN 
(London), Feb. 2, 2009, at 1.  Germany also has a significant problem collecting 
taxes, as thousands of Germans shelter funds from taxes in the Alpine country of 
Liechtenstein.  Id. at 3. 
 35. The Causes of and Solutions to the Federal Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, 
National Taxpayer Advocate), available at http://budget.senate.gov/republican/ 
hearingarchive/testimonies/2006/NinaOlsenTestimony.pdf.  Taxpayers who meet 
their own obligations but witness others’ noncompliance go unpunished might feel 
like “chumps.”  Id. 
 36. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 33, at 3 (finding that individual 
income taxes represent more than 50% of the tax gap); see also JASON FURMAN, 
Closing the Tax Gap, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 10, 
2006, 1–2, http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-10-06tax3.pdf (noting that $244 billion of the 
$345 billion tax gap comes from individual income taxes).  
 37. FURMAN, supra note 36, at 2. 
 38. The distinction between “tax avoidance” and “tax evasion” is unclear.  See 
GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that avoidance sometimes refers “to a legal 
reduction in taxes, while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal . . . .”).  
Most international tax reductions by individuals reflect evasion.  Id. 
 39. See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 21 (indicating that there are no official 
estimates of individual tax evasion, and that estimates of individual evasion, as 
opposed to corporate evasion, are difficult “because the initial basis of the estimate is 
the amount of assets held abroad whose income is not reported to the tax 
authorities.”). 
 40. Clea Caulcutt, France, Germany push for tax haven blacklist, 
FRANCE24.COM, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.france24.com/en/20081021-world-leading-
economies-tackle-tax-havens-oecd-france-germany.  France’s estimated GDP for 
2008 was $2.128 trillion.  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 
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B.  BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
Bilateral tax information exchange is the main tool by 
which the IRS gathers extraterritorial tax information.41  Using 
this mechanism, a nation enters into an agreement with another 
nation that requires both nations’ tax authorities to provide 
relevant tax information to the other nation upon request.42  
Bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) are 
increasing in number.43  Estimates put the number of bilateral 
tax treaties at greater than 1700.44  These agreements find their 
roots in the model taxation treaties created by the League of 
Nations in 1927.45  In 1927, states recognized that bilateral 
treaties, rather than multilateral conventions, would be more 
effective in dealing with the international tax evasion problem 
because fundamental differences in fiscal systems would make 
multilateral agreements difficult to conclude without intruding 
on national sovereignty.46 
There are, however, problems regarding the effectiveness of 
bilateral tax agreements.  In order to request information about 
a foreign person located outside U.S. territory who has failed to 
 
(2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
fr.html. 
 41. See Dean, supra note 9, at 608 (discussing the current barter system by 
which countries exchange tax information for tax information). 
 42. See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention, 
art. 26 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16801.pdf 
(describing the process of exchanging international tax information in order to carry 
out domestic laws). 
 43. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A 
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD—2007 ASSESSMENT BY THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION 9 
(2007) (The OECD, referring to eighty-six countries, noted that “[s]ince 31 December 
2005, 86 new DTCs [double taxation conventions] have entered into 
force . . . resulting in a total of 1814 DTCs in force . . . .”). 
 44. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1357, 1358 (2001) (referring to the 1920s as the decade in which countries created 
the system of international income tax enforcement mechanisms that has served as 
the “basis for more than 1700 bilateral income tax treaties now in force throughout 
the world.”). 
 45. See Dean, supra note 9, at 609 (“The roots of today’s extraterritorial tax 
information acquisition system can be traced back to . . . the foundational 1927 
League of Nations report on international taxation.”). 
 46. See Reports Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85 1927 II, at 23 (1927), 
available at http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/League/ 
League_Tech_Experts.pdf (noting that the Committee realized that a major risk of 
the Convention was “appearing in some quarters as an extension beyond national 
frontiers of an organised system of fiscal inquisition.”). 
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pay taxes, the IRS must establish the identity of the taxpayer 
under investigation in advance.47  The IRS must also 
demonstrate that it has exhausted all the available means by 
which it could have obtained the necessary information 
domestically.48  Another problem with bilateral treaties is that 
they often do not yield the necessary tax information in a 
particular case.49  For example, most of the agreements that the 
United States has in place are limited to criminal matters, 
which constitute a minor portion of overall tax revenues.50  In 
the event the IRS does obtain information via bilateral exchange 
agreements, the exchange of “bulk taxpayer information”51 and 
the trade of personally sensitive information52 raise profound 
privacy issues.  In one sense, bilateral agreements do not 
provide enough useful information.  In another sense, the 
exchange of bulk information provides too much sensitive 
information. 
Although bilateral agreements may seem preferable to a 
multilateral tax treaty in that they more easily accommodate 
differences in countries’ tax systems, this rationale does not 
 
 47. See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 20.  The agreements do not override bank 
secrecy laws, making it difficult to identify potential tax evaders. 
 48. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 42 (noting the “legal and practical 
impediments to the use of these [exchange-of-information] agreements.”). 
 49. The United States might not have agreements in place, as bilateral 
agreements often exclude developing countries.  See Markus Meinzer et al., Tax 
Information Exchange Arrangements 3 (2009), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/ 
upload/pdf/TJN_0903_Exchange_of_Info_Briefing_draft.pdf (noting that “TIEAs do 
not work for developing countries” because developing countries have little leverage 
and are unlikely to benefit from these agreements).  Furthermore, the countries with 
which the United States has an exchange agreement may have little to no tax 
information of use.  See id. at 4 (arguing that TIEAs are ineffective when the 
“information simply does not exist in the jurisdiction concerned . . . .”). 
 50. See Hearing on Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American 
Taxpayers Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. 
Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=7646 (noting that 
“most of the existing agreements are restricted only to criminal matters” and that 
these represent a “very small part of overall tax collections . . . .”). 
 51. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MANUAL 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS FOR TAX 
PURPOSES, MODULE 3 ON AUTOMATIC (OR ROUTINE) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ¶¶ 
1–4 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/23/36647823.pdf (noting 
that some tax information is exchanged automatically by law). 
 52. See Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other 
Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 
623–33 (2004) (discussing the privacy claims on bank information by foreigners with 
U.S. bank accounts and U.S. citizens with offshore bank accounts). 
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withstand scrutiny.  First, the IRS needs tax information from 
countries with radically different tax systems than the United 
States.53  As a result, bilateral tax treaties do not necessarily 
solve the problem of gathering the necessary information for 
IRS enforcement of U.S. tax laws.  The Bahamas, for example, 
do not levy taxes on personal income, capital gains, corporate 
earnings, dividends, or sales54 and thus may not have the 
information the United States needs to enforce U.S. tax laws if a 
bilateral treaty was in effect between the two countries.  Second, 
countries from which the United States needs information to 
enforce its tax laws may not have an agreement in place for the 
exchange of information.  For example, the Bahamas do not 
have a bilateral tax treaty with the United States, so the U.S. 
has no means of obtaining even the limited information that is 
available.55  Third, with the already large number of tax 
agreements, conducting future bilateral agreements may add 
unnecessary complexity, making enforcement more, not less, 
difficult.56  Finally, even if compelling arguments for bilateral 
tax agreements exist, they do not necessitate foregoing 
multilateral agreements.57 
 
 53. See Gregory Rawlings, Responsive Regulation, Multilateralism, Bilateral 
Tax Treaties, and the Continuing Appeal of Offshore Finance Centres 16 (Ctr. for Tax 
Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 74, 2005), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/ 
publications/WP/74.pdf (explaining that because “tax regulation was never 
internationalised by way of a multilateral agreement,” multinational companies 
“could take advantage of diversity in types, rates and definitions of tax” in different 
national regimes). 
 54. Raymond T. Gibson, The Bahamas – The Tax-Free Alternative to Florida, 
VAULT MAG., Sept. 2002, available at http://www.henleyglobal.com/fileadmin/pdfs/ 
media-events/articles/bahamas2002.pdf. 
 55. Despite the existence of hundreds of bilateral tax exchange agreements, the 
United States does not have agreements in place with many countries from which 
the United States needs tax information.  As of April 2009, the United States had 
tax treaties in place with only fifty-seven countries.  See INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, U.S. TAX TREATIES (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ 
p901.pdf.  Of the thirty-four jurisdictions listed as foreign secrecy jurisdictions in the 
Act, only five—Barbados, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—currently 
have bilateral tax treaties in place with the United States.  Id. 
 56. See Rawlings, supra note 53, at 7–8 (noting that the current international 
tax regulation scheme is not homogenous; instead, there are many competing 
regulatory orders that both intersect and diverge at vital moments).  Although the 
regulatory agendas of various bodies (e.g., the IRS and the OECD) do converge at 
points, they are likely to diverge from each other as well as from the agenda of a tax 
authority in an offshore financial center.  Id. 
 57. But see Haruhiko Kuroda, Japan’s former Vice Minister of Fin. for Int’l 
Affairs, Keynote Address at the First International Convention of the Asia-Oceania 
Tax Consultants Association: Economic Integration and Tax Harmonization in Asia 
and Oceania (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/ 
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C.  MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
There have been numerous attempts to deal with the 
problem of international tax evasion on a multilateral level.  
The OECD, the European Union, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the U.N. have all sought ways to spur 
international cooperation in tax administration by improving 
transparency or stimulating new exchange agreements.58  The 
OECD, for example, established criteria for identifying member 
countries with preferential tax regimes, identified jurisdictions 
as “tax havens” if they met certain criteria,59 and proposed new 
methods of cooperation with non-member countries.60  The 2000 
OECD Report identified thirty-five jurisdictions that might have 
been functioning as offshore tax havens.  It required those 
jurisdictions to express a commitment to cooperate by 2005 and 
threatened to apply sanctions if the jurisdictions did not express 
commitment before July 31, 2001.61  The U.N. Financial Action 
 
vmi021106e.htm (suggesting that bilateral tax treaties may need to be integrated 
into a multilateral one to harmonize taxation). 
 58. See generally Gianluca Pirozzi, Tax Havens and Relations with 
Industrialized Countries, COSMOPOLIS, Feb. 2007, at 1–3, http://agora.qc.ca/ 
cosmopolis.nsf/articles/no2007_2_tax_havens_and_relations_with_industrialized_cou
nt?opendocument (stressing the need to broaden the efforts to stymie tax evasion to 
include the concerns of poorer countries). 
 59. The OECD identified a tax haven by using four key factors: (1) “no or only 
nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances);” (2) “laws or administrative 
practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant information with other 
governments on taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction;” (3) “lack of 
transparency;” and (4) “the absence of any requirement for substantial activity.”  See 
generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/ 
1904176.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 1998]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 
MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS 
IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 2000]; ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: 
THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001), available at http:www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/ 
2664438.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON 
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf; see also Michael Littlewood, Tax 
Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 422 (2005) (highlighting 
how key terms such as “low” and “nominal” were undefined). 
 60. OECD, 2000, supra note 59, at 6 (noting the positive initial reaction to the 
OECD project on cooperation to remedy tax evasion). 
 61. Bruce Zagaris, Ethical Issues in Offshore Planning, 17 A.L.I. PROC. 365, 
391 (2008), http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/ 
CP017_chapter_07_thumb.pdf (noting that today, “five offshore financial centers—
Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, and Monaco—have refused 
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Task Force (FATF) also released a report in 2000 on “non-
cooperative countries or territories (NCCTs).”62  The critical 
enforcement mechanism of the FATF is Recommendation 21 
that provides: 
Financial institutions should give special attention to business 
relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and 
financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently 
apply the FATF Recommendations.  Whenever these transactions have 
no apparent economic or visible purpose, their background and 
purpose, should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings 
established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities.  
Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies 
the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply the 
appropriate countermeasures.63 
The FATF recommends regulations and monitoring to 
ensure compliance,64 but leaves it to individual jurisdictions to 
determine which countermeasures to apply in specific instances 
of tax abuse.65  The FATF is not a legal entity, so its 
recommendations are not binding on governments or on the 
private sector.66  The IMF, however, adopted the FATF 
recommendations in devising its review procedure to assess 
compliance with international anti-money laundering laws.67  
Furthermore, section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes 
the U.S. executive branch to monitor, regulate, and enforce 
countermeasures against “jurisdictions, financial institutions, or 
international transactions of primary money laundering 
 
[to express a formal commitment to cooperate]”). 
 62. Id. at 373 (noting that the FATF identified hindrances to money laundering 
prevention and detection, released the results of judicial inquiries regarding the 
same, and that FATF members agreed on a process for identifying NCCTs and 
international methods to incentivize compliance). 
 63. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/ 
34849567.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Zagaris, supra note 61, at 374 (noting that countermeasures may 
include not processing certain transactions or reporting transactions to tax 
authorities). 
 66. See Zagaris, supra note 61 at 375. 
 67. Zagaris, supra note 61 at 375; cf. Kern Alexander, Global Financial 
Standard Setting, The G10 Committees, and International Economic Law, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 877 (2009) (noting that the FATF has played a prominent 
role in international regulatory standard setting, but also noting that “[i]n recent 
years, however, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors have attracted much more policy 
attention since their standards have been recognized by the IMF and World Bank as 
international benchmarks . . . for compliance . . . .”). 
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concern.”68  Therefore, although FATF recommendations are not 
legally binding, they carry considerable force. 
1.  Criticisms of Multilateral Approaches 
Commentators have levied assaults at the OECD’s 
campaign against preferential tax regimes as being too one-
sided and unfair to non-OECD members.69  A U.N. panel’s 
recommendation to establish an international tax organization 
under the auspices of the United Nations,70 has similarly 
received a lukewarm response.71  Although a “World Tax 
Organization”72 could remedy the patchwork of bilateral 
treaties, and such an authority would have the power to compel 
compliance and punish malfeasance, “there is no international 
organization that appears capable of serving as the linchpin of 
such a regime.”73 
II.  THE CURRENT IMPETUS DRIVING THE CRACKDOWN 
ON TAX HAVENS 
Although tax havens are not a new phenomenon,74 they 
have grown recently because financial deregulation and 
globalization promote the international transfer of capital.75  
 
 68. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 311, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(A) (2008). 
 69. See, e.g., Littlewood, supra note 59, at 442–49 (reasoning that countries 
operate preferential tax regimes because doing so is in their economic interest); see 
also Pirozzi, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that “by asking them [weak-poor 
jurisdictions] to act ‘cooperatively’ and ‘openly’—the high taxation regimes . . . 
maintain their privileges and their power . . . .”). 
 70. See ERNESTO ZEDILLO, TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON 
FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 27–28 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/reports/ 
financing/full_report.pdf (describing the functions and benefits of creating an 
international tax organization). 
 71. See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Radical U.N. Tax Plans Threaten America, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ 
ed121803b.cfm (arguing that governments with free market systems, such as the 
United States, would be a target for persecution). 
 72. See Vito Tanzi, Is There a Need for a World Tax Organization?, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF GLOBALIZATION: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM PUBLIC ECONOMICS 173, 
173–86 (Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka eds., 1999) (lamenting that domestic 
legislators cannot keep pace with recent technological developments in financial 
markets). 
 73. Dean, supra note 9, at 663. 
 74. See, e.g., Pirozzi, supra note 58, at 5 (noting that during the nineteenth 
century, some territories, currently labeled as tax havens, were harbors of refuge 
where ships could shelter from pirates and foul weather). 
 75. See Birdsall, supra note 24 (noting that open, unregulated markets make 
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Besides the obvious motive to boost government coffers in a time 
of economic straits,76 there are multiple factors driving the 
initiatives77 to stem the tide of tax evasion.  Financial 
liberalization generally leads to increased economic instability,78 
because large amounts of capital flow easily into and out of 
jurisdictions.79  Furthermore, the attacks of September 11, 2001 
highlighted the use of tax havens to finance international 
terrorism.80  More recently, global tax scandals erupted in 
February and May of 2008: the Lichtenstein and UBS scandals, 
respectively.81 
 
tax evasion easier); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 50 (highlighting that while the 
ability to move capital, goods, and services has increased dramatically, tax 
administrators’ tools to combat tax evasion have not changed substantially). 
 76. See Press Release, Senator Levin, Statement of Senator Carl Levin on 
Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Mar. 2, 2009), http://levin.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/release.cfm?id=308945 (“I’m introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act 
. . . to stop tax cheats who drain our treasury of funds needed to pay for our 
recovery.”). 
 77. The OECD and the G-20 have both recently targeted tax haven countries.  
See William Boston, G-20 Leaders to Target Nations Harboring Tax Dodgers, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2009, at 6; David Crawford, OECD Compiles List 
of Alleged Tax Havens for G-20, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123733504461563913.html.  In addition to the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, there 
are other legislative proposals including draft proposals by the Senate Finance 
Committee, two related bills, S. 386 and S. 569, and a proposal by President Obama.  
See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at Summary. 
 78. See Robert Kuttner, The Bubble Economy: The Sub-prime Mess, the Huge 
Risks Taken by Hedge Funds, and the Conflicts of Interest that Led to Enron Are All 
the Consequences of Serial Bouts of Financial Deregulation.  Will We Reverse Field in 
Time to Prevent Another 1929?, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_bubble_economy (noting how the 
Glass-Steagall Act, which tightly regulated commercial banks, was weakened 
throughout the eighties until it was outright repealed in 1999). 
 79. See Sol Picciotto, Tackling Tax Havens and ‘Offshore’ Finance, TRANSNAT’L 
INST. 1–2, June 12–13, 2007, http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/picciotto.pdf (citing 
attempts to improve coordination of international financial regulation to protect 
against this systemic risk). 
 80. Sidney Weintraub, Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism, WASH. Q., 
Winter 2002, at 53, 56 (2002) (noting that tax havens are largely used by “tax 
evaders, criminals, and money launderers”). 
 81. A disgruntled bank employee in Liechtenstein provided German tax 
authorities with tax information regarding approximately 1400 persons.  See STAFF 
OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS 
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 2 (Comm. Print 2008).  For more on the UBS scandal, see 
infra Part II.A.2. 
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A.  TWO RECENT SCANDALS 
1.  The Liechtenstein Scandal 
German tax authorities, armed with the names of six 
hundred to seven hundred German taxpayers who were using 
Liechtenstein accounts to evade paying the comparatively high 
German tax rates, executed search warrants and arrested a 
prominent businessman for evading $1.46 million in taxes.82  
Shortly thereafter, the IRS initiated enforcement action against 
more than one hundred taxpayers who also had accounts in 
Liechtenstein banks.83  Approximately one dozen countries have 
announced a commitment to investigate potential tax evaders 
with accounts in Liechtenstein banks, evidencing the global 
scope of the scandal and the increased determination of 
countries to crack down on tax evaders.84 
2. The UBS Scandal  
A second worldwide tax scandal flared when the United 
States arrested a former UBS AG (one of the world’s largest 
banks) employee on conspiracy charges involving defrauding the 
IRS of $200 million in unpaid taxes on assets in Switzerland 
and Lichtenstein worth approximately $7.26 billion.85  The 
former UBS senior banker pled guilty in June of 2008 to 
 
 82. Carter Dougherty & Mark Lander, Tax Scandal in Germany Fans 
Complaints of Inequity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C1 (reporting that the scandal 
“brought down one of Germany’s most powerful business figures, Klaus Zumwinkel, 
who resigned . . . as the chief executive of the German postal service after the police 
raided his home.”). 
 83. IRS News Release, IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein 
Accounts 1 (Feb. 26, 2008) (“The Internal Revenue Service is initiating enforcement 
action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers to ensure proper income reporting 
and tax payment in connection with accounts in Liechtenstein.”). 
 84. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81, 
at 2 (“The national tax administrations of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New 
Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of America, all member 
countries of the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), are working together 
following revelations that Liechtenstein accounts are being used for tax avoidance 
and evasion.”). 
 85. Nick Mathiason, Tax scandal leaves Swiss giant reeling: UBS could lose its 
licence in America after an official confessed to illicit tactics that helped clients avoid 
the Revenue, OBSERVER, June 29, 2008, at Business & Media, 4, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jun/29/ubs.banking (noting that Birkenfeld 
confessed to hiding diamonds in tubes of toothpaste and intentionally destroying 
offshore bank records).  
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conspiracy to defraud the IRS.86  The Department of Justice 
detained the U.S. citizen’s Swiss co-conspirator, Martin Liechti, 
as a “material witness” to the investigation.87  This enforcement 
action is unprecedented, representing the first time the United 
States has initiated criminal charges against a Swiss banker for 
helping a U.S. taxpayer evade taxes.88  On June 30, 2008, the 
United States filed a petition with the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida for permission to “file an IRS 
administrative summons with UBS asking the bank to disclose 
the names of all of its U.S. clients who have opened accounts in 
Switzerland, but for which the bank has not filed forms with the 
IRS disclosing the Swiss accounts.”89  The Court approved 
service of the summons and the IRS served the summons in 
July of 2008.90  The case ultimately settled, as the U.S. 
Department of Justice deferred prosecution of UBS in exchange 
for UBS paying $780 million and agreeing to cease its cross-
border business in entities not registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.91  As part of the settlement, the 
 
 86. See Statement of Facts at 1, United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-CR-60099-
ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. 2008).  U.S. District Judge William Zloch ultimately sentenced 
Birkenfeld to forty months in prison.  Kevin McCoy, U.S. officials indict 2 Swiss 
citizens in UBS case, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2009, at B1. 
 87. Sean Farrell, UBS Plans to Shed 5,500 Jobs Amid Market Turmoil, INDEP., 
May 7, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ubs-
plans-to-shed-5500-jobs-amid-market-turmoil-822233.html. 
 88. Judge Alfred J. Lechner Jr. sentenced John Mathewson, the owner and 
executive of an offshore bank in the Cayman Islands, to only five years of probation, 
five hundred hours of community service, and a $30,000 fine because Mathewson’s 
cooperation with tax authorities led to an unequaled number of leniency pleas.  See 
Ronald Smothers, In Plea Deal, Banker Outlines Money Laundering in Caymans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/03/us/ 
in-plea-deal-a-banker-outlines-money-laundering-in-caymans.html. 
 89. Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 1, Case No. 
08-21864-MC-LENARD/GARBER (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (asking UBS for the 
names of U.S. clients for whom UBS “(1) did not have in its possession Forms W-9 
executed by such United States taxpayers, and (2) had not filed timely and accurate 
Forms 1099 naming such United States taxpayers and reporting to United States 
taxing authorities all reportable payments made to such United States taxpayers.”).  
This petition for leave to serve summons is authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f), 
which requires court approval for an IRS administrative summons that does not 
identify that taxpayer’s name under investigation.  See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81 at 3. 
 90. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Behind UBS Case, A Dogged IRS: For Messrs. 
McDougal and Reeves, ‘It’s Just a Matter of Detective Work’, WALL ST. J., July 14, 
2009, at C1. 
 91. Press Release, UBS, UBS Settles US Cross-Border Case with the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.ubs.com/1/e/about/newsalert?newsId=162297. 
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Swiss government agreed to give the names of 4,450 U.S. 
citizens suspected of using secret Swiss accounts at UBS to 
evade taxes.92  The summons was the first attempt by the 
United States to “pierce Swiss bank secrecy by compelling a 
Swiss bank to name its U.S. clients.”93 
III.  U.S. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE: THE STOP TAX 
HAVEN ABUSE ACT 
In 2007 Senators Barack Obama (D) of Illinois, Carl Levin 
(D) of Michigan, and Norm Coleman (R) of Minnesota sponsored 
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,94 but the legislation languished 
in committee.95  Some analysts cite the political power of big 
commercial banks, such as Citigroup, as the reason why the 
United States has not previously clamped down on U.S. banks 
that do business with foreign banks that have neither a physical 
presence in the United States, nor a connection to regulated 
banks.96  Lawmakers may decide whether to enact the Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act or similar legislation as early as the 2009-
2010 legislative session.97  Legislators might also find it 
politically difficult to oppose legislation that could raise billions 
of dollars in government revenues by stymieing efforts geared 
 
 92. See Graham Bowley, From the Global Financial Crisis, A Push by Counties 
to Repatriate Cash; Broad Political Trend Underlies UBS Decision to Release Clients’ 
Names, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24, 2009, at 15 (noting that although the 
settlement is a victory for the United States, “[t]he actual process of recovering the 
names may become lost in bureaucracy and foot-dragging” and “smaller Swiss banks 
. . . are confident that they can continue to profit by finding new ways to protect the 
privacy of their clients . . . .”).  But see Lynnley Browning, U.S. Indicts Two in 
Switzerland on Tax Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at B1 (highlighting that the 
Justice Department’s indictment of Hansruedi Schmacher, a director at NZB Neue 
Zurcher Bank of Zurich, and Matthias W. Rickenbach, a Swiss lawyer, for conspiring 
to defraud the United States, signaled that Justice would pursue “smaller players” 
including professionals who assist individual account holders). 
 93. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81 at 3. 
 94. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 95. See Govtrack.us: A Civic Project to Track Congress, H.R. 2136: Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2136 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 96. See LUCY KOMISAR, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, CITIGROUP: A CULTURE AND 
HISTORY OF TAX EVASION (2006), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/ 
Citigroup_-_a_culture_and_history_of_tax_evasion.pdf (discussing Citigroup’s long 
history of using offshore shelters to help clients evade taxes). 
 97. See Jackie Calmes & Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Asks Curb on Use of 
Havens to Reduce Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A1 (noting that the Obama 
proposal riled powerful business interests). 
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toward illegal tax evasion.98  “With the worsening U.S. budget 
and deficit situation, increased pressure exists . . . to enhance 
tax enforcement . . . against persons who intentionally deposit 
income in offshore jurisdictions” making “increased 
international tax enforcement a likely priority that will receive 
increased resources and political focus.”99  Passage of the Act 
may be part of a concerted global effort to crack down on tax 
havens that “play host to many non-regulated hedge funds that 
were partly blamed for the global financial crisis.”100  After 
governments bailed out banks to stave off the global financial 
crisis, many politicians wonder why some financial institutions 
are still conducting transactions in countries considered tax 
havens.101  Finally, the fact that President Obama was one of 
the sponsors of the 2007 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act has fueled 
speculation that the 2009 Act will pass.102 
 
 98. See Francis, supra note 33 (“If the nation’s economic woes continue, 
lawmakers will probably have a more difficult time opposing legislation that could 
raise billions . . . .”); see also Jay Krause & Christopher McLemore, Pennies from 
Havens: Obama Pledges Crackdown on Offshore Banking Jurisdictions, WITHERS 
LLP, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.withersworldwide.com/news-
publications/455/pennies-from-havens-obama-pledges-crackdown-on-offshore-
banking-jurisdictions.aspx (explaining that President Obama has not indicated he 
would back down from such a measure despite the sorry state of the economy; 
highlighting that Congress recently enacted an exit tax on individuals who 
expatriate, demonstrating a willingness to target this source of revenue; and noting 
that such an Act might be useful in raising revenue to fund portions of the economic 
stimulus package). 
 99. Bruce Zagaris, Swiss Government Reportedly Will Give U.S. Names of UBS 
Depositors, 24 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Dec. 2008, at 12. 
 100. Tax Havens Face Blacklist Pressure—Global Financial Crisis, THE 
AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 22, 2008, at 32. 
 101. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, questioned, “Is it normal 
that a bank to which we [France] guarantee loans or allocate our own funds 
continues operating in tax havens?”  President Sarkozy, answering his own question, 
said, “The answer is no.”  Id.; see also Lucia Kubosova, EU States Crack Down on 
Tax Evasion, EUOBSERVER.COM, Oct. 22, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26976 
(“German finance minister Peer Steinbruck insisted . . . ‘Switzerland offers 
conditions that prompt German taxpayers to evade taxes . . . .’”); Emma Thomasson 
& Saeed Azhar, Offshore Under Scrutiny but Secrecy to Survive, HEDGEWORLD 
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
WealthManagement08/idUSTRE49E41S20081015 (noting how the financial crisis 
will increase the pressure on tax havens because government officials will have to 
finance large rescue packages and politicians have “decided pursuing offshore 
centers was politically popular.”). 
 102. See Gavin Hinks, US Launches New Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act: Senator 
Carl Levin Proposes New Act Claiming Tax Havens Are Engaged in ‘Economic 
Warfare’ with US, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2237713/launches-stop-tax-
haven-abuse (noting that speculation has begun that the Act will become law now 
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When Sen. Levin offered testimony in support of the bill, he 
cited “tax abuses that rob the U.S. treasury of an estimated 
$100 billion each year, reward tax dodgers using offshore 
secrecy laws to hide money . . . and offload the tax burden onto 
the backs of middle income families” as the reasons why 
Congress should pass the Act.103  According to Levin, the Act 
would give the government “powerful tools to end offshore tax 
haven . . . abuses” and that “[w]ith the financial crisis facing our 
country today and the long list of expenses we’re incurring to try 
to end that crisis . . . it is long past time for Congress to stop tax 
cheats . . . .”104  Such motivation is understandable in light of 
the fact that the United States has a national debt of greater 
than $10 trillion105 and pays almost $500 billion annually in 
interest on that debt.106  An objective observer, regardless of her 
feelings about the fairness of the tax code, might have difficulty 
siding with tax evaders rather than taxpayers.  Before 
examining the tools the Act gives tax authorities to decrease the 
incidence of tax evasion, it is useful to examine the current 
methods by which the IRS enforces U.S. tax policy. 
A.  THE CURRENT METHODS OF TAX ENFORCEMENT 
The IRS generally expects a U.S. taxpayer to voluntarily 
report all of her income.107  Nevertheless, if a taxpayer conducts 
a transaction within the United States, the IRS has methods to 
procure some information regardless of taxpayer reporting.  For 
example, a U.S. payor or broker must report numerous types of 
payments, e.g., interest, wages, dividends, and unemployment 
compensation, to the IRS and the taxpayer.108  If the taxpayer 
 
that previous bill sponsor Obama is president). 
 103. Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, supra note 76. 
 104. Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, supra note 76, at Part II. 
 105. Jackie Calmes, 2 Paths, but One Result: Bigger Deficits for U.S.; Analysts 
Are Critical of Spending Plans; Elections 2008, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008, at 
6. 
 106. In fiscal year 2006, for example, the U.S. government spent $406 billion in 
interest on the national debt.  U.S. Dep’t of Treas. Bureau of the Pub. Debt. Interest 
Expense on the Debt Outstanding, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/ir/ 
ir_expense.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
 107. See, e.g., Eileen Ambrose, Canceled Debt May Bring Big Tax Bill from IRS; 
Amount Forgiven Counts as Income in Many Cases, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2008, at C5 
(highlighting that the IRS wants and expects people to pay taxes on their income on 
a “pay-as-you-go basis,” including canceled debts worth less than $600 which 
constitute “other income”). 
 108. See I.R.C. §§ 6042 (dividends), 6049 (interest), 6050B (unemployment 
compensation), 6051 (wages) (2006). 
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who receives this reported information fails to provide his 
taxpayer identification number (TIN)109 to the payor or broker, 
the IRS requires backup withholding of tax.110  The IRS may 
examine relevant books and records to determine a taxpayer’s 
liability and can summon the taxpayer or others to produce such 
records or give testimony, on penalty of perjury, toward that 
determination.111  For example, the IRS may summon a U.S. 
bank to produce the banking information of an individual the 
IRS suspects of underreporting her income.112  Lastly, U.S. 
banks must report all suspicious banking transactions by filing 
Suspicious Activity Reports and all currency transactions 
exceeding $10,000 by filing Currency Transaction Reports.113  
The IRS has access to these reports, can audit bank records, and 
can sue to impose civil and/or criminal penalties on banks found 
to be in violation of these reporting requirements.114 
1.  Foreign Enforcement is Difficult 
In stark contrast to domestic reporting requirements, IRS 
reporting obligations generally do not reach foreign payors or 
brokers.115  Furthermore, to attract foreign clients, some 
countries, e.g., Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland, 
guarantee client confidentiality and account holdings secrecy.116  
 
 109. Under penalty of perjury, a U.S. citizen or resident must provide her name, 
address, and TIN when opening a bank account at a domestic bank.  ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes 
Appendix I, ¶ 1.5.5.3.1 (2000) [hereinafter OECD BANK REPORT]. 
 110. I.R.C. § 3406(a); see Blum, supra note 52, at 593 (identifying the means by 
which the IRS can obtain tax information). 
 111. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1)–(3); see also Blum, supra note 52, at 593. 
 112. See Blum, supra note 52, at 593–94 (explaining that U.S. District Courts 
are “authorized to compel compliance with the summons and to use the contempt 
power toward this end.”).  Although the Right to Financial Privacy Act generally 
safeguards individuals’ banking information, there are exceptions for enforcement of 
I.R.C. provisions, for example, the administrative summons provided in I.R.C. § 
7609.  See Id. at n.49 (citing OECD BANK REPORT). 
 113. See Blum, supra note 52, at 594; see also OECD BANK REPORT, supra note 
109, app. I, ¶ 1.4 (citing Reg. § 103.21–22). 
 114. OECD BANK REPORT, supra note 109, Appendix I, ¶ 1.6 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5531 and 5332); see also Blum, supra note 52, at 594 (explaining that the purpose of 
such measures is to “protect against money-laundering as well as tax evasion”). 
 115. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1584–85 (2000) (explaining that 
when neither “withholding at the source or information reporting . . . is 
available . . . as in the case of foreign income, compliance rates drop dramatically.”). 
 116. See Greg Brabec, The Fight for Transparency: International Pressure to 
Make Swiss Banking Procedures Less Restrictive, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 231, 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  9:37 AM 
262 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
In fact, in certain jurisdictions like the Bahamas, where taxes 
are minimal to nonexistent,117 the governments may not collect 
tax information from banks at all.  Moreover, some countries 
might not have the capacity to collect the sophisticated tax 
information that U.S. tax authorities seek.118  Regardless of the 
reason why tax information is unavailable, U.S. tax authorities’ 
requests for information directed to the executives or judiciaries 
of such countries usually fall on deaf ears.119  Therefore, bank 
secrecy jurisdictions have become attractive destinations for 
illicitly earned monies, funds used for illicit purposes such as 
money laundering or political corruption, or deposits meant to 
evade U.S. income reporting requirements.120  Regardless of 
whether the source or use of the funds is legitimate, offshore 
secret accounts shield interest paid on monies held from U.S. 
tax authorities, and the IRS might find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to collect taxes based on these sources of funds.121 
B.  THE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT’S TREATMENT OF TAX 
HAVENS 
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act initially identifies thirty-
four offshore secrecy jurisdictions.122  Most of these jurisdictions 
are small and some are very small.  Anguilla, for example, has a 
landmass of only ninety-one square kilometers, or about half the 
size of Washington D.C., and a population numbering 14,436.123 
 
232 (2007) (noting that the Swiss take pride in a “highly secure banking system” and 
have historically touted their banks as places where account holders’ identities and 
holdings are kept secret). 
 117. See Gibson, supra note 54. 
 118. Some developing countries do not have the means to collect tax revenues.  
It makes sense that countries incapable of collecting taxes would also lack the ability 
to collect sophisticated tax information.  See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, 
Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development 6 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished draft 
prepared for a course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries, 
World Bank, April 28-May 1, 2003), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/ 
LearningProgram/PracticalIssues/papers/introduction%20to%20tax%20policy/WBI%
20Module%201(Bird&Zolt)April10.doc (“[G]enerally, the capacity of countries to 
collect taxes appears to rise as income levels increase.”). 
 119. See Blum, supra note 52, at 595 (noting that some governments impose 
penalties on employees who break bank secrecy laws, and that other countries do 
not have tax treaties with the United States to facilitate information exchange). 
 120. Id. at 596. 
 121. See id. at 596 (noting that even if the source of the funds is legitimate, “it 
may be impossible for the IRS . . . to collect debts against these assets.”). 
 122. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009).  The 
list is based on IRS court filings.  GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 3. 
 123. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at 
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Some of these jurisdictions are relatively rich, such as the 
Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, and Alderney),124 
while others are relatively poor.125  Regardless of their economic 
status, most of these countries are small in terms of both land 
and population size, and weak in the arena of international 
affairs.126  In other words, they make easy targets. 
1.  Defining a Tax Haven 
The first step to stopping tax haven abuse is to identify tax 
havens.  According to the Act, the term “offshore secrecy 
jurisdiction” means “any foreign jurisdiction . . . listed by the 
Secretary [of the Treasury] as an offshore secrecy 
jurisdiction.”127  Under the Act, the Secretary determines which 
jurisdictions are offshore secrecy jurisdictions based on the 
existence of tax secrecy laws that “unreasonably restrict the 
ability of the United States to obtain information relevant to the 
enforcement [of the Act], unless the Secretary also determines 
that such country has effective information exchange 
practices.”128  
The Act defines secrecy or confidentiality rules and 
practices as “both formal laws and regulations and informal 
government or business practices” that inhibit “access of law 
enforcement and tax administration authorities to beneficial 
ownership and other financial information.”129  To determine 
which countries have ineffective information exchange practices, 
 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html.  According 
to the CIA, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 2004 was US$8,800.  
Anguilla’s GDP at purchasing power parity in 2004 was US$108.9 million.  Id. 
 124. Jersey is an island in the English Channel, northwest of France.  According 
to the CIA, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 2005 was US$57,000.  Id. 
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/je.html. 
 125. Although Vanuatu is not one of the poorest places in the world, 70% of its 
population makes its living by subsistence farming.  According to the CIA, per capita 
GDP at purchasing power parity in 2007 was US$4400.  Id. at https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nh.html. 
 126. See generally Michael Isaacson, The Tax Haven the OECD Forgot? Harmful 
Tax Competition? Harmful to Whom? Learn About the Real Agenda Behind OECD’s 
Blacklists of Offshore Tax Havens, http://www.offshore-fox.com/offshore-
corporations/offshore_corporations_0401.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (explaining 
how politicians target foreign jurisdictions because domestic tax hikes at home are 
politically unpopular). 
 127. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009) (amending 
76 U.S.C. § 7701(a)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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the Act authorizes the Secretary, on an annual basis, to classify 
any jurisdiction as an offshore secrecy jurisdiction unless the 
country: (i) has a treaty or some type of information exchange 
agreement with the United States; (ii) the exchange of 
information was adequate in terms of preventing tax evasion or 
avoidance of U.S. income tax during the 12-month period of 
review prior to the annual determination; and (iii) such 
jurisdiction, during the 12-month review period, “was not 
identified by an intergovernmental group or organization of 
which the United States is a member as uncooperative with 
international tax enforcement . . . .”130  Finally, the Secretary 
has the authority to add or remove a jurisdiction from the initial 
list based on whether or not they improve their exchange-of-
information practices.131 
2.  Ambiguous Definitions 
The Act’s definition of “tax haven” is ambiguous.132  While 
there are standards by which the Secretary must make a 
determination, there are few concrete criteria by which to make 
that finding.133  For example, whether a country has an 
established tax treaty with the United States is a verifiable 
criterion.  Whether a jurisdiction has rules or practices that 
unreasonably restrict U.S. access to tax information, however, 
lies in the eye of the beholder.134  It is plausible to argue that 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Much of the legal criticism of the Act has focused on the patenting of tax 
strategies and the implications of the Act for lawyers’ professional responsibilities.  
See, e.g., Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents, Taxes, and the Nuclear Option: Do We 
Need a “Tax Strategy Patent” Ban Treaty?, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (2008); 
Nicholas Robinson, Patenting the Tax Code: Monopolizing Basic Tax Strategy, 5 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 50 (2007); Craig E. Groeschel, Comment, Tax Strategy 
Patents Considered Harmful, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 271 (2008); Stephanie L. 
Varela, Note, Damned If You Do, Doomed If You Don’t: Patenting Legal Methods and 
Its Effect on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1145 (2008).  
Instead, I focus on the lack of clarity and equity in the Act’s treatment of tax havens. 
 133. See Krause & McLemore, supra note 98 (noting the criticism that the initial 
list of jurisdictions does not differentiate between jurisdictions that do conform to 
widely accepted international standards, i.e., countries that have recently penned 
TIEAs with the United States, and those that have not). 
 134. See Rawlings, supra note 53, at 3 (“The principles . . . devised by 
multilateral organisations and offshore financial authorities are subject to divergent 
interpretations between regulators and regulatees.  It is social actors – lawyers, 
accountants, fund managers, tax compliance regulators – who frame these contests, 
through their daily deeds and narrated reflections on their practices.”). 
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the mere existence of tax secrecy rules is an objective factor.  In 
that case, Switzerland, famous for its bank secrecy laws,135 is an 
obvious choice for the list and does appear as a listed offshore 
secrecy jurisdiction.136  Whether those rules “unreasonably 
restrict the ability of the United States to obtain information 
relevant to . . . enforcement,”137 however, is another matter.  
The Act does not define what constitutes a reasonable 
restriction on the exchange of tax information.  In that way, it 
seems discretionary—one might say arbitrary—whether the 
Secretary believes a country’s bank secrecy provisions unduly 
restrict U.S. tax authorities’ ability to obtain the necessary tax 
information.  Additionally, it is unclear how the Secretary would 
determine whether the bank secrecy laws or some other factor 
prevented U.S. tax authorities from making use of relevant 
information to enforce U.S. income tax.  For example, Swiss 
bank UBS told Senate investigators that approximately 20,000 
U.S. clients have about $18 billion in deposits in UBS 
Switzerland.138  In the summer of 2008, a federal court granted 
the IRS permission to pierce Swiss bank secrecy laws and 
demand the identities of 19,000 American clients who “failed to 
disclose their Swiss-based accounts on U.S. tax returns.”139  If 
UBS readily defied Swiss bank secrecy laws, did those tax 
secrecy rules unreasonably restrict IRS access to relevant tax 
information?  Assume UBS agreed to circumvent Swiss bank 
secrecy laws contingent on a U.S. federal court granting the IRS 
permission to attempt to pierce bank secrecy laws.140  If the 
federal court had not granted the IRS leave to seek the 
identities of U.S. citizens with accounts in UBS, was it the 
Swiss tax secrecy laws or the federal court order that restricted 
U.S. tax authority access to the necessary tax information?  
Assume that UBS disclosed the identities of the 19,000 
individuals who failed to comply with the U.S. reporting 
requirement, but that the IRS could not handle that volume of 
tax evaders.141  Under the Act, this might be a sufficient reason 
 
 135. See Brabec, supra note 116, at 231; Hilzenrath, supra note 7. 
 136. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. §101(a)(1) (2009). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D3. 
 139. Id. at D3. 
 140. See Evan Perez, Guilty Plea by Ex-Banker Likely to Aid Probe of UBS, 
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2008, at C1 (stating that prosecutors in the Birkenfield case 
sought to delay sentencing while they attempted to use Birkenfield’s knowledge to 
“pierce the centuries-old secrecy for which UBS and other Swiss banks are known.”). 
 141. Martin Lobel, Chairman of the Tax Analysts Information Service, argued 
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to label a foreign jurisdiction a tax secrecy haven. 
3.  Who the Act Does Not Include—Countries Operating 
Preferential Tax Regimes 
Some jurisdictions not on the Act’s initial list, such as the 
United States, have higher than nominal income taxes, but 
exempt some forms of income from those taxes as part of a 
preferential tax regime.142  In fact, “no major capital-importing 
country has been able to impose such a tax [on interest paid to 
foreigners] for fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere. . . .”143  
For that reason, most countries are tax havens.  That is, 
individuals intentionally route transactions through foreign 
countries because of the savings earned by avoiding taxes on 
interest.144  In practice, this means that the Act cannot 
completely solve the erosion of the U.S. tax base because it only 
targets countries with bank secrecy laws, rather than countries 
that operate preferential tax regimes.  Because the Act would 
subject jurisdictions on the list to heightened scrutiny and 
potential sanctions, it seems hypocritical and inequitable to 
target tax secrecy jurisdictions, and not countries that operate 
successful tax preferential regimes.145  Such hypocrisy could 
weaken foreign actors’ resolve to comply.146  The absence of 
 
that the IRS could not handle that many tax evaders.  A former federal prosecutor 
turned tax defense specialist, Edward M. Robbins Jr., countered that the Justice 
Department, separate from the civil lawyers working for the IRS, could handle such 
a caseload.  See Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D01. 
 142. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 115, at 1576.  As of 1984, the United States 
exempts taxes on interest paid to non-residents. 
 143. Id. at 1576. 
 144. See Littlewood, supra note 59, at 460 (“individuals and firms routinely 
conduct transactions through such jurisdictions for no other purpose than to escape 
taxes . . . .”). 
 145. For example, China operates a very successful tax preferential regime.  See 
Tola Adewola, China Approves Bill to End Preferential Tax Treatment for Foreign 
Companies, ILL. BUS. L.J., (March 27, 2007), available at 
http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois_business_law_soc/2007/03/will_chinas_ 
new.html.  Domestic Chinese companies pay a statutory income tax rate of 33%, but 
foreign companies, such as foreign service companies, qualify for preferential rates 
of income tax of 15% or 24%.  China enacted a new enterprise income tax law (EIT), 
effective January 1, 2008, that largely ended preferential tax treatment for foreign 
companies operating in China.  Significantly, however, two categories of 
companies—foreign high-tech and other important industries, and foreign 
companies with small profits—still pay preferential income taxes.  Id. 
 146. See generally Shelter Offshore, In Support of Offshore Tax Havens, Nov. 3, 
2008, http://www.shelteroffshore.com/index.php/offshore/more/in-support-of-offshore-
tax-havens-10147/ (arguing that entities like the OECD and U.N. “make veiled 
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countries operating preferential tax regimes from the Act’s 
initial list makes sense politically.  It is much easier to take on 
the likes of Vanuatu than China.147 
4.  Musical Havens—The “Shift” Argument 
Because of the inherent lag in listing countries as offshore 
secrecy jurisdictions—the Act specifies a 12-month period 
preceding the annual determination—the Act is more likely to 
shift tax evasion to untargeted tax havens rather than eliminate 
targeted jurisdictions.  A country not on the initial list, Liberia 
for example,148 might advertise itself as protecting account 
holders’ identities and holding amounts by offering client 
confidentiality guarantees.  During the 12-month lag period, 
that country is likely to win business that might otherwise have 
gone to targeted foreign secrecy jurisdictions.149  This argument 
may seem like a stretch because the burden of transferring 
funds or transfer-driven scrutiny would deter shifting funds in 
the manner described.150  However, in an era in which it is 
easier than ever to transfer funds from one jurisdiction to 
another, unless all tax havens cease to exist at once, the specter 
of musical havens is a real one.151 
 
claims” that tax shelters are corrupt, “yet, there is so much hypocrisy in what many 
of these entities and bodies say and actually do . . . .”). 
 147. In 2000, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs requested each OECD-
member country to self-identify aspects of its tax regime that would constitute a 
preferential tax regime according to OECD standards for such a regime.  The 
results, perhaps not surprisingly, showed that Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the 
United States all operated a preferential tax regime.  OECD, 2000, supra note 59, ¶ 
5, 11; Littlewood, supra note 59, at 428.  From this OECD list, generated in 2000, 
only Switzerland and Luxembourg appear on the Act’s initial list of foreign secrecy 
jurisdictions.  Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009).  As 
long as countries continue to maintain preferential tax regimes, the absence of those 
countries from the Act guarantees that the U.S. tax base will continue to erode. 
 148. In 2000, the OECD identified Liberia as a tax haven.  OECD, 2000, supra 
note 59, ¶ 17. 
 149. See Littlewood, supra note 59, at 463 (noting that if one tax haven is 
eliminated, “the surviving havens will win business that would have gone through 
those havens that have been shut down.”). 
 150. See Nick Cohen, At Least Germany Stamps on Tax Havens, OBSERVER, Feb. 
24, 2008, at Comment & Debate, 38, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2008/feb/24/germany.globaleconomy (noting the increasing global 
focus in cracking down on tax havens). 
 151. See David Cay Johnston, Musical Chairs on Tax Havens: Now It’s Ireland, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at C1 (highlighting companies that shifted funds to tax-
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5.  Failing to Account for Other Countries’ Interests 
The Act will fail to eliminate tax havens for the simple 
reason that it fails to account for other nations’ interests.  In 
terms of taxation, putting U.S. citizens first might not be 
objectionable.152  Consider, however, the reasons why a country 
might enact strict bank secrecy laws or allow transactions that 
other countries’ tax authorities would consider objectionable or 
suspicious.  One underlying rationale is survival.  For example, 
Nauru, a small island in the South Pacific Ocean, has a total 
area of 21.3 square kilometers (8.2 square miles), and is the 
world’s smallest independent republic.153  Rich phosphate 
deposits are the country’s main economic resource, but because 
of mining and the depletion of this resource, the country’s per 
capita GDP is declining.154  Given the country’s size and 
declining resources, one incentive to operate as an offshore 
secrecy jurisdiction might be the lack of available alternatives 
for economic growth.155  Even countries that do have available 
alternatives, Singapore for example, lack an economic incentive 
to comply with the U.S. law.156  Singapore has said it will not 
budge, despite pressure to undo its strict bank secrecy 
provisions, presumably because those provisions are precisely 
 
friendly Ireland following legislative crackdowns on Bermuda). 
 152. See Graetz, supra note 44, at 1371–72 (explaining that historically, “the 
power to tax is rarely delegated to multinational organizations,” and “we [U.S. 
citizens] regard our obligation for the well-being of our fellow citizens as more 
pressing than for people in need elsewhere in the world.”).  But see Allison 
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L LAW 99, 99 
(“[T]his view of sovereign autonomy over taxation is increasingly inconsistent with . 
. . . global economic reality. . . . Major theoretical developments in tax policy are now 
arising not through solely national political and legal processes but through the 
interactions of nongovernmental actors in transnational settings.”). 
 153. REPUBLIC OF NAURU: PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 
NAURU COUNTRY PROFILE, http://www.un.int/nauru/countryprofile.html (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2009). 
 154. See UNITED NATIONS, NAURU, http://www.un.int/nauru/nauru.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
 155. See Anthony B. van Fossen, Money Laundering, Global Financial 
Instability, and Tax Havens in the Pacific Islands, CONTEMP. PAC., Fall 2003, at 237 
(explaining that multilateral attempts to exclude Pacific Islands from the 
international financial system has those jurisdictions “battling for their survival”).  
One can surmise that those countries would not risk such severe consequences 
without equally strong motivations. 
 156. See Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition and Economic 
Performance, 6 PROSPERITAS issue III (2006), at 1 n.2, available at 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Papers/taxhavens/taxhavens.pdf (noting how 
countries like Singapore are in direct competition with the United States for 
investment from the United States and other countries). 
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what lure international financial investors.157  The Boston 
Consulting Group predicted offshore assets will reach $8.8 
trillion by 2012, giving foreign banks a strong financial 
incentive not to cooperate with U.S. tax authorities.158 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES THAT CONSIDER OTHER 
COUNTRIES’ INTERESTS 
The problem is not that the Act puts U.S. interests first.159  
Rather, the problem is that although the United States is 
dependent on other countries for tax information in order for the 
IRS to enforce U.S. tax policies,160 the Act does not consider 
other countries’ interests in promoting bank secrecy.161  The 
U.S. motivation is obvious.  When other countries hold 
themselves out as tax shelters and guarantee bank secrecy, U.S. 
taxpayers cheat on their tax returns.162  This decreases the U.S. 
tax base by depleting financial resources that the government 
can use to support its initiatives.163 
Motivation for a country like Nauru is relatively simple as 
well.  Because Nauru’s resources are declining, one source of 
economic security is the foreign investment attracted by the 
country’s bank secrecy laws.164  Alternatives that consider 
others’ economic interests—while not necessarily requiring the 
subordination of U.S. interests—are a policy that trades cash for 
tax information and an international tax organization with 
domestic enforcement powers. 
 
 157. See Thomasson & Azhar, supra note 101, at 1 (“Singapore says it will not 
budge on its tough bank secrecy laws despite EU demands . . . .”). 
 158. See Thomasson & Azhar, supra note 101, at 1 (“The Boston Consulting 
Group has forecast total offshore assets under management will climb to $8.8 trillion 
by 2012 from $7.3 trillion in 2007 . . . .”). 
 159. See Graetz, supra note 44, at 1371–72 (arguing that it is natural, both 
historically and politically, for policy makers to give primacy to U.S. citizens’ 
interests in national policy, including tax policy). 
 160. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39. 
 161. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 162. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2006, at C1 (giving examples of U.S. citizens who cheat on their taxes, such 
as Robert Wood Johnson IV, the owner of the New York Jets, and Charles and Sam 
Wyly, founders of the Center for Public Integrity). 
 163. See id. (proving examples of what governments might use tax revenues for, 
e.g., infrastructure or providing for the needy). 
 164. See Van Fossen, supra note 155, at 237. 
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A.  CASH FOR TAX INFORMATION 
If the United States were to purchase tax information, the 
goal would not be to collect as much information as possible, but 
to collect only the smallest amount of information necessary to 
enforce tax laws.165  Once the United States identified a 
jurisdiction from which it needed tax information, that 
jurisdiction’s willingness and ability to provide the necessary 
tax information would become an issue of price negotiation.166  
The final price might include compensation necessary to repay 
private parties and “to offset the burdens imposed” on foreign 
governmental actors.167  This market system of tax information 
acquisition takes into account another country’s non-reciprocal 
need for tax information or its inability to gather such 
information.  If the U.S. paid less for such information than the 
amount of tax revenue that information would produce, the 
system would account for all parties’ interests.  By doing so, a 
net importer of tax information, such as the United States, could 
acquire extraterritorial tax information from a country with 
relatively small amounts of collected tax information, such as 
the Bahamas.168 
The current method of bilateral exchange—trading tax 
information for tax information—remains fundamentally 
unchanged since before World War II and is outdated.169  Rather 
than using sanctions to force countries into compliance as the 
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would do, the United States might 
allow the use of cash as consideration for specific tax 
information.170  This would allow an importer of tax information 
 
 165. The IRS has previously limited the amount of tax information collected.  
See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
790, 807 (2007) (noting the end of IRS “general audits” according to the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program). 
 166. See Dean, supra note 9, at 659 (“[T]he United States could negotiate with 
the governments of those jurisdictions the specific nature of the information . . . as 
well as regarding the price at which it would be willing and able to provide it.”). 
 167. See id. at 659–60. 
 168. See id. at 611 (noting that a more complete market would allow a country to 
“maximize its utility and to minimize its impact on privacy” even if they collected 
little or no information.”); see also Gibson, supra note 54 (stating that the Bahamas 
does not levy taxes on “capital gains, corporate earnings, personal income, sales, 
inheritance, or dividends.”). 
 169. See Dean, supra note 9, at 611 (highlighting for example, that net tax 
information importers, such as the United States, could acquire specific tax 
information, rather than import homogenized information en masse, which is less 
useful and more invasive). 
 170. See Dean, supra note 9, at 611. 
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to acquire tax information ex post, thereby decreasing the 
privacy concerns associated with the shipment of tax data.171 
However, the possibility of market failure still exists in this 
cash-for-information system.  For example, the fair price for 
information might exceed the revenues generated by the 
acquisition of information or a bilateral monopoly might prevent 
a more complete market.172  Even though a purchaser of tax 
information would acquire tailored information making privacy 
less of a concern, a nonmarket solution might provide more 
robust privacy protections than a market alternative.173  A 
governmental alternative might avoid market failures. 
B.  A NEW MULTILATERAL INSTITUTION 
Because leaders have political and financial incentives to 
act in nationally self-interested ways, a transnational body with 
domestic tax authority could overcome the problem of 
extraterritorial tax information acquisition.174  Such a 
transnational actor would need to have powers on par with the 
domestic capabilities of national tax authorities, which would 
impinge on traditional notions of national sovereignty.175  
 
 171. With the increasing advent of identity theft and hackers, the case for 
limiting the information sent to the IRS is strong.  See ROBERT F. DACEY, 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE 
CENSUS: INFORMATION SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE, BUT WEAKNESSES AT THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONTINUE TO POSE RISKS (2003), reprinted in TAX 
ANALYSTS, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 106-12 at 6–7 (2003); see generally Peter P. 
Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 497 (1999) (“The possibility of intrusions . . . is a powerful 
argument against allowing unlimited government access to sensitive personal 
information of any kind.”).  There is also the risk that an IRS employee might 
conduct an unauthorized search of an individual’s tax information.  See Andrea 
Coombes, IRS Employee Sentenced for Snooping: Tax Man Eyes Tax Records of 
Almost 200 Celebrities, Including Kevin Bacon, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 20, 2008, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/irs-worker-snooped-tax-records/ 
story.aspx?guid={786BACBD-C58F-481B-AE31-28C2101E7CF6}&dist=msr_1. 
 172. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8, at 62 (6th ed. 
2003) (noting that a bilateral monopoly occurs and causes high transaction costs 
when neither party has a beneficial alternative to “dealing with the other”). 
 173. See generally Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal Rules to 
Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847, 860–73 (2003) 
(discussing the importance of privacy protection in the Internet era). 
 174. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 38 FIN. 
& DEV. 1, Mar. 1, 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm 
(noting the distant, and more utopian, possibility of a world tax organization that 
would facilitate the international collection and distribution of tax revenues). 
 175. See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State 
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Recently, two existing international organizations, the United 
Nations and the OECD, have vied for leadership of a new global 
tax authority.176  Both the United Nations and the OECD are 
capitalizing on their history of work aimed at increasing 
international tax cooperation.177  In theory, either organization 
could fill the gaps generated by the current patchwork system of 
bilateral tax treaties and avoid the inequity of the multilateral 
conventions on tax information acquisition.  In practice, 
however, the reality is much different. 
The OECD’s exclusive membership fuels non-members’ 
perceptions of discrimination in the development of 
international tax rules.178  This generates a perception of 
illegitimacy whereby large powerful countries dominate smaller, 
weaker ones in the realm of tax policy and enforcement.179  
Although the OECD might have more power than the United 
Nations to enforce an international tax regime, it lacks the 
necessary international legitimacy because of its membership 
makeup, which includes historically powerful nations, such as 
the United States, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom.180  While the United Nations 
might have greater international credibility as a fair arbiter of 
 
Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG. 151, 173 (2002) (noting that such an organization might 
spell the end of the traditional Westphalian system of sovereignty). 
 176. Dean, supra note 9, at 661–62. 
 177. See, e.g., U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Model Double 
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. No. 
ST/ESA/102 (1980), reprinted in STANLEY S. SURREY, United Nations Model 
Convention for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries: A 
Description and Analysis, in 5 HARV. L.SCH. INT’L TAX PROGRAM & INT’L BUREAU OF 
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SELECTED MONOGRAPHS ON TAXATION 87-113 (1980). 
 178. See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World Tax 
Organization” Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 136, 185–86 (2006) (arguing that extending OECD membership to 
different countries will “help to allay concerns that the OECD has been ‘captured’ by 
multinational firms based in OECD countries” and noting that “the perceived 
influence of these firms may be reducing the legitimacy and effectiveness of OECD 
reform efforts.”); Littlewood, supra note 59, at 480–85 (describing pitfalls to OECD 
reform efforts, including the fact that the membership is not viewed as 
representative of the entire world). 
 179. See Alexander Townsend, Jr., Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to 
Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 215, 251–58 (2001) (arguing that 
the 1998 and 2000 OECD reports “mark a coercive and intrusive solution that 
deviates from traditional fiscal remedies.”). 
 180. Dean, supra note 9, at n.370; see also Littlewood, supra note 59, at 480–85.  
For a list of OECD member nations, see Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.sb05.com/OECDJ.html (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
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international tax controversies,181 it lacks sufficient power to be 
a transnational tax enforcer.182  Countries, especially the United 
States, might resist the necessary curtailment of sovereignty for 
international tax enforcement.183  Realizing its incentives to 
resist U.N. enforcement authority, the United States might 
recognize other countries’ similar incentives to work against the 
successful enforcement of a U.S. dominated multilateral tax 
regime such as the OECD.  Thus, tax evasion is a global 
problem requiring a global solution.184 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Globalization, the September 11th attacks, and two recent 
scandals have put tax havens in the legislative crosshairs.  The 
Obama Administration fully supports the Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act.185  Because of President Obama’s unqualified 
support, the political popularity of cracking down on tax evaders 
in tough economic times, and banks’ decreasing ability to fight 
against such measures, the Act is likely to pass.  The 
centerpiece of the Act is a list of offshore secrecy jurisdictions.  
Although some of the motives behind enacting such legislation 
are laudable and some of the Act’s provisions are commendable, 
the Act is unlikely to garner cooperation from countries vital to 
its success.  The Act fails to account for other countries’ 
economic interests.  Although alternatives are not perfect, they 
are preferable.  A market solution, such as allowing the United 
 
 181. See U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, 
Institutional Framework for International Tax Cooperation, ¶¶  5–10, at 4–5, U.N. 
Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2003/L.6 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/LTD/NO3/481/35/PDF/NO348135.pdf?OpenElement (“The United Nations 
has recognized for some time the need to give the developing and transitional 
countries a voice in the formulation of international tax norms.”). 
 182. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory 
of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 506 (2005) (noting the weakness of the 
United Nations’ ability to enforce compliance). 
 183. See, e.g., Daniel Mitchell, U.N. Tax Police Potential, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2002, at A18 (expressing concern that a U.N.-led international tax organization 
would be costly to the United States). 
 184. See Palan, supra note 175, at 173 (“[A]ny serious attempt to combat the tax 
havens phenomenon would have to be conducted on a multilateral level.”); see also 
MICHIEL VAN DIJK & FRANCIS WEYZIG, THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF TAX HAVENS: THE 
CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 3 (Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen 
[Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations] 2008) (2007) (arguing that the 
Netherlands must end harmful tax policies but that the tax haven problem requires 
a global solution). 
 185. Drawbaugh & Daly, supra note 3. 
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States to purchase tax information from other countries, or an 
intergovernmental solution, such as a World Tax Organization, 
would facilitate a greater exchange of extraterritorial tax 
information and bolster the enforcement of U.S. tax laws. 
